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· !"'OR RELEASE CN DELIVERY

SPEF.CH QF SENATOR MIKE MAl'TSFIELD
C'N AMENDMENT ADOLISHING FOA

During the past eight years, foreign aid has been an integral part
of our policy of uniting with other nations to provide in common for the security
of the free world.

With economic assistance from this co•mtry the states of

Western Europe have rebuilt factories , farms, and homes which were
by war.

destroy~d

They have repaired economics which otherwise might have been sub-

verted by Communists.

Military assistance has helped to build a rnutual defense

system which so far has staved off Soviet acgression .

In short, foreign aid has

been a positive expression of our desire to cooperate for economic well - being,
peace, and freedo1.1 throughout the world.
I have consistently supported the

~~Iutual

Security Program and its

forerunners because I felt that the military preparedness and the economic
stability which they promoted were in the best interests of the American people.
This year, however, I feel that certain changes must be made in the organization
and arlministration of the Mutual Security Program if it is to continue to serve
these constructive purposes.

The time has come to abolish the For<:'if'n

Operations Administration as an independ<'nt agency.

Continued. existence 1.)f

the FOA creates unnecessary duplication and waste in administration; it
threatens to prolong unnecessarily the life of economic aid; and it jeopardizes
the success of our foreign policy.
I realize that when a bill involves huge amounts of money as this one
does and deals with vital questions of foreign policy , it is easy to overlook the
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details of administration.

Rut the success of any legislation is inextricably linked

with the manner of its administration.

If the type of o1·g<mization for carrying out th

this program can be improved so as to make it more effective and less expensive ,
I feel we must undertake that improvement before

Wt!

arc: justified in providing

new appropriations.
The immediate need is to prepare for the termination of foreign aid in
an orderly manner.

Some of th e

r eason~

for this are obvions.

Needless to say ,

continuation of a one-way program beyond the rlat0 of absolute need is an unwarranted tax on the resources and people of the Uuited States .

The huge financial

burden involved in the Mutual Security Program has bewn allud(>d to many times
in debate in the Senate ove r the years.

I have long held the view that it should

be terminated as quickly as possible.
Nevertheless, the Administration continucc to justify itc continuance

today on the grounds that our national security r equires it, not only for one more
year but for an uncertain period into the future.

An effort is made to prepare the

people of this country for an ind efinite continuation of grant aid .

At the same time

an unwarranted and dangerous expectation of continued assistance is built up in
peoples abroad.

Last year, for instance, the Secretary of State said :

• • • f.._'6u:_7 mutual security planning must be and is lonurange planning ••• We must think in terms of policies
and programs that we can afford to live with for what may
be a very long time •• ••
Mr. Stassen, director of the program, said at about the same time that we might
have to help strengthen the rest of the world through a ten-year period.

- 3 I agree with the view that

We

need allies in this world, strong allies

in both an economic and a military sense.

However, I do not consider an

indefinite extension of one-way aid as a practical or effective way of maintaining
such allies.

One - way aid is a temporary method of obtaining a specific objective.

The Marshall plan aid, for example, had as its purpose the r estoration of the
economies of Europe,
efficiently,

That purpose was accomplished successfully and

The present descendent of the Marshall Plan has no such clear-cut

purpose nor does it promise much success .

It appears to be largely "aid for

aid's sake, 11 It must not be allowed to la st for "a very long time" or "ten years"
but must be ended in the near future.

If it is not replaced by long -range clear-cut

programs, such as two-way trade programs, economic aid can defeat the very
foreign policy which it is supposed to promote.

It puts proud, independent

nations in the position of being eternal recipients of charity,

It puts lazy and

ineffective governments in the position of not having to exert themselves on behalf
of the people they are supposed to serve since they can count on support from this
country.

The net effects of continuance of economic aid could be a decrease in

the unity of the free nations and their strength and the postp0nement of the search
for a sound and permanent solution to their economic problems,
Last year I pointed out that foreign aid had already reached the point
of diminishing returns.

This year there are signs that our foreign aid is r eaping

a harvest of division instead of unity, of mutual resentment i nstead of mutual
understanding.

Even the increase in the number of weapons and equipped

divisions abroad cannot counterbalance these adverse developments.
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This year we have an excellent opportunity to make the changes in
organization which will allow and encourage the orderly termination of one-way
aid.

Foreign aid programs must be integrated with foreign policy to insure the

most economic and effective administration of both.
H. R. 9678 presents a much needed codification of existinG legislation
affecting mutual security.

This consolidation will replace what P r esident

Eisenhower last year called a "patchwork of statutes" and clear up somewhat
the hitherto confusing relationship among various parts of the program .
In this new codified bill , the President is given broad o r ganizational
authority .

He could , if he chose, r emove from the Foreign Ope rations Adminis-

tration all non - military aid programs and relocate then1 under the Department of
State .

However, the President made clear in his aid mes::iage of this year that

he favored the continuation of the Foreign Ope rations Administration.

In effect ,

therefore , the foreign aid bill of this year would petrify Reorganization Plan No. 7
of last year.
I would like to point out that this is actually the first chance the Senate
has had to vote on the reo1·ganization .

P lan No. 7 became effective , not because

the Senate voted !or it, but because the Senate did not vote against it.
One major goal of the President's Reorganization Plan No. 7 was to
streamline the administr ation of the various aid programs, and cut down on the
duplication, ove rlapping , and excess personnel which had become apparent at
United States civilian posts abroad .

The reor ganization plan centered all the

foreign aid programs in an independent agency, the Foreign Operations
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Administration, which actually was a successor to the Mutual Security Agency .
Unfortunately, I believe that the reorganization plan of last year went only half
way toward achieving the efficiency and other goals which were promised.
The reorganization of last year served some useful purposes.
field, personnel has been cut somewhat.

In the

This was a constructive step because

the huge number of American officials abroad was creating resentment among
local people in many areas, as well as in the United States, and causing confusion,
waste, and duplication.

The functions of the office of th ~ United States Special

Representative in Europe, now l;:nown as USRO, for example, w e re sharply
curtailed; its functions are now lim ited to providing representation for the
United States to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organizat~.on

and other multilateral

organizations, such as the Office of European Economic Cooperation and the
European Payments Union.

The n'..lmbcr of persons with the rank of Ambassador

serving abroad has also been cut down.

For a while, this titl e had become so

common in our missions in European capitols that it began to assume comic-opera
aspects.
In the countries abroad which I visited last year there was undoubtedly
some cla1•ification of lines of authority and some reduction in the duplication of
functions at our missions as compared with the pre·:.rioL'lS year .

This clarification

probably resulte d frorn th0 Reorganization plans,
However, I f e el that more can be done in this line if the next logical
step were taken and the FOA were abolished and such essential economic
functions as must be continued were given to the Department of State.

In fact,

- 6 i£ this is not done, I believe that the gains which have been made will be shortlived.

All over the world there are still three principal civilian agencies opera -

ting at practically every major post -- the Department of State, the Foreign
Operations Administration, and the United States Information Agency.

As I

noted in my report on the Foreign Operations Administration after my study trip
to France, Italy , Nepal, and Indo china last fall, the presence of t.hree separate
agencies is an open invitation to administrative confusion and duplication.

With

three parallel offices in Washington some such duplication already exists in the
personnel offices, t!'n.nsportation offices, and ot!1cr

t~,l)')S

o f auministrative

services of FOA, USIA, and the Oepartr>lent of State in tHs: ccuntry.
steps are t:\ken to repl:l.cc the p:.:esent 1-tit-or-miss ho?C for
these agencies wW1 sometr.hg
structure , ther e

sho.l~

mo~:e

Unless

coopera~ion

among

tan:3ible b the w:t.y of administrative

be em inevit:lhle growt'1 of confcsion of author:ty both at

home and in the field.
In regard to military assistance, the President has already begun to
bring a measure of logic into its administration.

He made clear in his State of

the Union message that this yeat· he would favor giving the Secretary of Defense
p r imary responsibility for the administration of foreign military assistance,
operating with the pol.:cy guidance 1)f the Secretary of State.
considered g;.Yes ef:ect to

t~is in~ el"ll

The bill now being

l' y ('lim:nating the 1·esponsibility of the

Director of FOA for l:1e continuous supervision and general direction of military
assistance.
The change should clear up a heretofore confusing situation.

Until now,

the precise role of the Foreign Operations Administration in military aid was

- 7 obscure.

The Foreign Operations A genc y was to receive policy guidance from

the Defense Department, and the Defense Department administered military aid,
but the FOA supposedly coordinated and supervised these activities of the Defense
agency, in a kind of administrative merry - go -round. It now is obvious, even to
the Administration, that the FOA is not necessary for military assistance.
Right here I would like to point out that this Administration seems to
follow completely different principles for the Department of Defense and the
Department of State.

There is no r eluctance to mer ge operating and policy -

ma!<ing responsibilitiea in the same hands in the Department of Defense. In fact,
that was the premise of Reorganization Plan No. 6 of last year concerning the
Defense Department.
On the other hand, the premise of Reorganization P l an No . 7, as well
as Plan No . 8 which set up the independent United States Information Agency, was
that the Department of State should not have operating responsibilities; that in the
field of foreign affairs, operations and policy should be separated. I would like to
quote from the report of the House Committee on Government Ope rations on
Reorganization Plan No. 7; a report which was far from enthu siastic about the
plan:
The committee noted that the basic concept under lying the changes proposed in Reorganization Plan No . 7
is diametrically opposed to that which was presented in
Reorganization Plan No . 6 ( Department of Defense). In
P lan No. 6 the argument was made that policy and ope rations were inseparable to the degree that policy r esponsibility must be vested in the same officials who were responsible fo r day - to -day operations. By contrast, the
emphasis in plan No . 7 is on a separation of policy re sponsibility from operational functions.

- 8 T;1is sa ne split philosophy is revealed again this year.

The military

assistance programs now have :)een clearly made the responsibility of the Department of Defense ,

However, the FOA continues to adrninistcr the non -military

aid programs even though they are just as much a part of our foreign pnlicy as
n•ilitary asGislance is a part of our defense policy.
There is no reason why the State Department could not handle ope1·ating
pronrams as does the Defense Department.

I cannot subscribe to the philosophy

that foreign policy can only be made in an ivo ry tower insulated from contact with
the programs which carry out that foreign policy.

It is, as I have mentioned

before, extremely wasteful in concept h<;cause it necessitates duplication of
functionG both here in Washington and abroad.
integrated policy and program.

Beyond this it prevents an

It is entirely possible that the l eft hand frequently

does not know what the right is doing.
I certainl)' agree with the P r esident that the Department of State should
develop and control foreign policy.

However , I do not believe that this aim can

be accomplished by taking away functions so intimately linked with foreign policy
as foreign aid and the information program .

I think this separation of policy and

operations accounts for many of the complaints that the United States speaks not
with one but with multiple voices abroad.

IIow can we expect to have a unified ,

integrated foreign policy when the Secretary of State refuse s to assume responsibility for foreign operations?
I believe further that the separation of policy and operations accounts
for certain failures in our foreign policy .

It partially accounts for the failure of

- 9 our aid in Indochina.

There, although we provided ample military and economic

aid, it failed to prevent a Communi at victory.
aid given in a political vacuum.

In part this may be because it was

So n 1c of the materials which we supplied to Indo-

clina now rest in part in Communist hands as a result of defections; some have
been blown np bf the retreating non-communist forces.

How many millions of

do llars of aid paid for by the American people was wasted this way? Is this the
result of aid insufficiently integrated with foreign policy?
Another example of the disastrous effects of the separation of policy
and program in foreign affairs is the decr e asing effectiveness of the Point Four
program.

Recently I have been very disturbed at the reports I have read and

even situations which I have seen f•) r myself which I attribute largely to Point
Four's lo cation i n F OA -- reports that the Point Four program has lost its
identity; that the core of the staff has been dismissed; that its humanitarian
a s pects have been buried by the cynics; that the program is becoming a singleaaency operation rather than a coordinated effort among various government
agencies; that the long-range character of the prog:tam has been sacrificed for
i mmediate ends; indeed, the executive branch this year in presenting its development assistance program (a name t o camouflage economic aid) stated that development assistance "is required to make possible, or to accelerate, projects or
activities ••• " of the r'oint Four type.
I would be m o re confident that the Point Four program, as is provided
in the pending bill, and all our foreign aid operations were supporting our foreign
policy, if they we1·e actually within the Department of State .

The lines between
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policy and operation can never he distinctly drawn, and no amount of attempted
coordination between FOA and the Department of State, no matter how wellintentioned, can substitute for actually making the two part of the name
ad n inistrativc structure .

Is it necessary that the State Department administra -

tive structure be duplicated by another administrative superstructure for an
independent Foreign Operations Administration?
Not only could the Department of State administer the program more
efficiently at the present time, but it would be in a much better position to
terminate the programs when they should be terminated, on their own merits,
The termination would work less hardship on the personnel of the FOA if they
were within the Departmeut of State with opportunities for abso r ption into other
actiYilics .
President Eisenhower recently said that 79o/o of the new appropriation
for foreign aid will be used for programs "essentially of a military nature."
However, as we know , a large amount of outright economic aid continues under
the guise of such euphonisms as "direct forces support, 11 "mutual defense
support" and "development assistance. 11 Much of this is really economic
assistance given what the FOA probably bclicven are more palatable names,
Administration of this assistance forms the major responsi0ility of the Foreign
Operations Administration. If it ceases or is severely curLed as it soon must be ,
the agency 1 s functions for all practical purpo ses would come to an end.
There would remain only the small - scale, l ong -range programs such
as !-oint Four, which are housed in FOA ,

Would Point Four then be used as a
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justification for continuing FOA as an independent agency?

Would the tendency

be to expand this program into a massive operation, independent of foreign
policy considerations, in order to retain the agency?
If all of FOA 1s functions were housed in the Departments of State and
Defense where they should be, then the temporary programs could be ended
without disrupting the whole department, without working a shocking hardship
on the personnel involved, Moreover sound long-range programs like Point Four
would not be jeopardized by obscuring them in temporary programs which until
the Administration changed its mind last year everyone seemed to agree should
go.
If we do not take these necessary organizational steps to bring our

foreign aid programs to an end in an orderly way, we may be confronted with a
decision to bring an end to them with no adequate preparation, undoing much of the
good which has been done to date, As of June 30, the Committee report notes an
estimated
/ unexpended balance of over $9.7 billion. Thus, without additional appropriations,
there would be almost three times this year's requested appropriation available
for liquidation in accordance with last year's bill.

If we add to this figure of $9. 7 billion the $3. 1 billion authorized by
the pending bill, there will be a grand total of $12. 8 billion available to spend,

If

the program is t e rminated over the next thr ee years, in the case of military
assistance, and the next two years, in the case of economic assistance, as provided in the present bill, over $4. billion will be available each year for
expenditure.

Even if one considers only the unobligated carryover of $2. 6 billion,
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plus the $3.1 of new money, the total of $5.7 would need to be obligated at the
rate of nearly $2. billion annually to be exhausted at the end of three years.
I know the argumer,ts against this reasoning -- that the unobligated
funds have been "programmed" and other nations expect the assistance.
Vlllat I say is that we must have the kind of administration of these
programs that will think of them as something temporary and to be te1·minated
the instant our national interest requires.

Unless we can have that kind of

assurance, and we cannot in my opinion have such assurance as long as FOA
continues, it becomes necessary to fix a legislative termination date for the
programs.
That is what this legislation does.
Mr. President, when the Committee on Foreign Relations considered
the bill now before us, I offered two amendments for conc;ideration.

One of those

amendments concerning the termination of foreien aid programs was adopted.
Since its adoption there have been a good many questions raised as to its purpose.
There have also been intimations that I did not know what I was doing in submitting
the amendment and suggesting that Members of the Committee had something put
over on them. I am sure that a vigorous effort will be made in conference to
delete my amendment or to have the conference report interpret it out of
existence.
So there may be no doubt as to what the amendment does and so that
it may be clear what the amendment is designed to do, I propose to discuss it

briefly.

•
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According to figures supplied by the Department of Commerce, this
government has since the war given about $34 billion of aid to foreign countries.
For the most part this aid has been administered by independent agencies of the
government which, in the initial stages at l eas t, were viewed

a~

temporary

agencies. But as time has gone on these agencies have tended more and more
to assume a permanent character.
While it is true that the Economic Cooperation Administration was
abolished, it was succeeded forthwith by the Mutual Security Agency.

Most of

the same people were in the same jobs, in the same buildings, at the same desks,
and with the same telephone numbers. In time, the Mutual Security Agency gave
way to the Foreign Operations Administration.

Under Reorganization Plan No. 7

of last year, the FOP. was given some permanent-type programs, such as the
technical assistance program, to operate .
What has been happening gradually is that temporary agencies are
giving way to permanent agencies, emergency programs are becoming permanent
programs -- in short, the philosophy i s gradually being developed that fo1·eign
aid is something we must always have with us, like the Post Office, or the
Department of Agriculture .
Members of Congress have been worried by this process.

Their

concern, it seems to me , has had two interrelated aspects.
First, they have felt that the continuation of an independent agency for
the operation of foreign aid programs makes it difficult to stop foreign aid when
it is not necessary.

The psychology of an independent agency such as FOA is
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almost automatically to thin!< in terms of the foreign aid to be recommended each
year.

It does not ask whether foreign aid is necessary.

rather with where foreign aid is to go , and how much .

The agency is concerned
It is not likely to approach

the job of programming foreign aid for Country X by asking if aid is necessary.
It is more likely t o decide that Country X sho uld have aid because Country Y is

getting aid.
The first concern of many Members of Congress, it seems to me then,
is how to get rid of the idea that there must be an independent agency for permanent foreign aid programs .
The second concern of many Members is that the executive branch of
the government as a whole seems to have accepted the idea that foreign aid will
always be with us .

There is a belief that there is no alternative to fo reign aid .

There may be talk about "trade, not aid 11 but fundamentally the belief persists
that there is no alternative to continuation of big aid programs for many , many
years ,
During hearings on this aid bill I pursued this question with Mr. Dulles
and with Mr. Stassen.

Both of them, as I have indicated, took the position that

foreign aid must continue into the indefinite future .
Mr. President, the more fundamental of these two concerns of
Members of Congress , is that the philosophy of continuous, unending foreign aid
is becoming engrafted upon our government .

The independent agency which t ends

to become permanent is a symptom of this situation, not a primary cause .
Last year, the Senate adopted an amendment which I propc-sed, setting
June 30, 1954, as the time when authority conferred by the Mutual Security Act

- 15 should expire, except insofar as powers might be continued for purposes of
liquidating the programs. It was specified that liquidation of the military
programs would need to occur within 36 months, the economic programs within
24 months.
Despite the explicit language of the amended provision, the administration 1->roceeded as if the words of the law did not mean what they said.

They

seemed to assume that somehow the Congress did not know what it was doing.
The Foreign Operations Administration continued in business as if nothing was
meant by the language.

The President gave the FOA new operating responsi-

bilities of a permanent cha1·actc r,

And this year, the FOA came back to

Congress proposing that most of the same programs be continued on the same
basis, except that there should be no termination date fixed for the programs.
Mr. President, I had under consideration two amendments to present
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The first amendment simply provided

that the Foreign Operations Administration should be abolinhed as of December 31

1954 -- r oughly five months from now. I hoped, by pressing for this amendment,
to eliminate an important symptom of foreign aid psychology.

It was my thought

that if FOA were abolished, we might anticipate that the Departments of State and
Defense would approach the problem of foreign aid, not as if it were a permanent
part of government ope rations , but rather as something special, to be relied on
in special circumstances and to meet specific needs.
There were objections to that a rnendment .

Five months was believed

to be too short a period to terminate FOA despite the fact that the legislation

- 16 last year fixed June 30, 1954, as the date when aid programs were to terminate
-- thus making the independent agency of FOA unnecessary.
I decided then that I should offer my second amendment, reestablishing
a date for te r mination of foreign aid, a year later than the date fixed last year.
The amendment I presented was adopted .

By shortening the military aid

termination period from 36 to 2.4 months, and the economic aid termination
period from 2.4 months to 12. months, I believe expression is still given to the
language in last year ' s bill.
Mr . President, a good many people have come around to me and said:
"You don't really mean that military and economic assistance are to end, do you?
What you really want is to abolish FOA and have military aid programs administered by the Defense Department and economic aid programs to be administered
by the State Department."

As clearly as I can set it forth, Mr. President, here is wh:tt I want,
and what I believe the amendment provides.
First! except for technical assistance and a few other procrams ,
foreign aid is to end as of next June 30 .

The amendment belies the proposition

that military and economic foreign aid programs arc a permanent part of the
foreign policy of this nation.
Second, the amendment makes it reasonable to expect that the
President will take immediate steps to abolish FOA as an independent agency of
this government and transfer its residual functions elsewhere, because, there
being no foreign military and economic aid progra ns authorized beyond next
June 30, there will be no need for such an agency.
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Third, if the re is a need next year for any additional military aid to
selected countries, it would be logical to expect that the Department of Defense,
in cooperation with the Department of State for its guidance in the foreign policy
implications of such aid, would present specific, limited military assistance
programs to the Congress.
Fourth, if there is need next year for any additional economic-type
assistance pro crrams to selected countries, the Department of State would present
such programs to the Congress for its consideration.
Finally_, Mr. President, this amendment makes it clear that the
technical cooperation program (P oint IV) i s to be administered by the Department
of State.

That program under the terms of the amendment has a long-term

licens e- - or at least, a no -term license as of now -- to continue operations to
the extent autho rized by annual appropriations.
Mr. President, I anticipate that next year the Congress will give careful attention and consideration to any recommendations the President may make
with respect to specific foreign military aid requests and requests for economic
a s si s tance to foreign countries in special cases.
I hope that the executive branch of the government will get the idea from
our action this year, however, that Congress and the American people cannot
accept the concept that foreign aid is a permanent part of the foreign or military
policy of this natio n.

******

